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Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans
After Parents Involved: Bringing State




In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1,l a sharply divided Supreme Court struck down two race-conscious
school assignment plans aimed at achieving greater racial integration of
the public schools. While the case has many facets,2 it is an especially
apt choice for this symposium since the communitarian-liberal
* Carter Professor, University of Georgia Law School. The author wishes to thank
Dan Coenen and Jason Solomon for helpful comments on a draft of this Article.
1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. See, for example, the variety of perspectives from which the case is examined in
the Harvard Law Review's issue on the Supreme Court's 2006 Term. 121 HARV. L. REv.
1 (2007). Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities:
"Perception " Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REv. 4, 87-94 (2007), argues that
the "Capabilities Approach" to constitutional interpretation favors race-conscious
integration efforts and criticizes the holding in Parents Involved. Heather K. Gerken,
Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REv. 104 (2007),
examines Justice Kennedy's evolving views on race-conscious government programs and
maintains that his opinions "invite us to abandon our monolithic stories about race and
think about equal protection in domain-centered terms." Id. at 130. James E. Ryan, The
Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REv. 131 (2007), focuses on the
impact of the decision on efforts to integrate the public schools, arguing that "this
decision does not change much on the ground," id. at 132, but that "it takes away some
hope" for the future. Id. at 133. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville
School Cases: There Is No Other Way, 121 HARV. L. REv. 158 (2007), expresses deep
skepticism of race-conscious remedies and defends Chief Justice's plurality opinion and
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion.
Another recent article broadly criticizes the Court for its rulings in Parents Involved
and other recent cases, characterizing the conservative majority as "an unbreakable
phalanx bent on remaking constitutional law by overruling, most often by stealth, the
central constitutional doctrines that generations of past justices, conservative as well as
liberal, had constructed." Ronald Dworkin, The Supreme Court Phalanx, 54 N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2007, at 92, 92.
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dichotomy helps to illuminate a critical issue on which the Justices
diverged. Communitarians typically fault classical liberalism for
favoring the individual over the community as a whole. 3 In Parents
Involved, for example, both Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion and
Justice Kennedy's concurrence accord considerable respect to the
individual's right against discrimination on the basis of race, however
beneficial the school districts' goals may be.4 Taking the side of the four
dissenters,5 a communitarian critic may object that avoiding racial
isolation deserves more weight than the majority accords it. Moreover,
placing the problem in historical context bolsters the case for these
student assignment plans: current segregation is due, at least in part, to
earlier government decisions.6 Given this history, communitarians may
argue that the school districts' interest in achieving racial integration into
the community as a whole should carry the day.7
3. The fairness of this characterization is open to debate, for "liberalism" comes in
many varieties, some of which are more individualistic than others. See MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1-2 (2d ed. 1998). The libertarian wing
would raise no objection to the notion that liberalism favors the individual over the
community. Libertarians vigorously defend the primacy of the individual over the
community and squarely reject the communitarian critique. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974) (arguing that "no moral balancing act can take
place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead
to a greater overall social good."). But many liberals seek to have it both ways, holding
that one can begin from individualistic premises and nonetheless give great weight to
communitarian values. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 195-206 (1986)
(discussing "the obligations of community"). Nonetheless, communitarians find fault
with liberalism's individualistic premises. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 3, at 147-52
(arguing, on page 151, that "the moral vocabulary of community in the strong sense
cannot in all cases be captured by a conception that in its theoretical basis is
individualistic.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. See 127 S. Ct. at 2751-52 ("when the government distributes burdens or benefits
on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict
scrutiny" because "racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the
most exact connection between justification and classification") (internal quotations
marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (distinguishing
these student assignment plans from other means of pursuing integration, such as
"strategic site selection of schools," that "are race conscious but do not lead to different
treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by
race.").
5. The dissenters in Parents Involved were Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg. See 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 90 (charging that "Chief Justice Roberts'
rosy picture of an available 'non-racial' way of educating children is simply unrealistic in
the light of history and current realities.") (footnote omitted).
7. See 127 S. Ct. at 2801-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In this part of his opinion,
Justice Breyer documents the history of efforts to remedy past discrimination through
race-conscious remedies, in Seattle, Louisville, and elsewhere. He concludes that
"[tihese facts and circumstances help explain why in this context, as to means, the law
often leaves legislatures, city councils, school boards, and voters with a broad range of
choice." Id. at 2811. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The Justices' opinions in Parents Involved, of course, do not frame
the problem in terms of communitarian values versus individual-centered
liberalism. Nor should we expect them to do so, for constitutional
doctrine rarely borrows so directly from political philosophy. Instead, in
the Court's school integration lexicon, the state's responsibility to
remedy segregation is addressed by the distinction between de jure (i.e.,
state-supported) segregation and de facto segregation (i.e., segregated
schools for which the state is not responsible).8 All the Justices agree
that a race-conscious remedy can be justified for a school district subject
to a current court order finding government-sponsored segregation. 9 The
issue dividing the two sides is whether race-conscious student
assignment plans can avoid or survive "strict scrutiny"' 0 absent a current
court order mandating that a deliberately segregated school system be
dismantled. The majority and Justice Kennedy rule that, at least in the
cases that have thus far come to the Court, such plans cannot stand."
The four dissenters would rule that they can.'2
The content and the legal implications of the de jure/de facto
distinction deserve attention in this symposium because of the role the
distinction plays in Parents Involved, because it has shaped school
desegregation rulings for over thirty years, and because it clashes with
communitarian theory.' 3  Communitarians tend to reject sharp
distinctions between practices for which the state is responsible (such as
de jure segregation) and those for which it is not (such as de facto
segregation). They hold that such distinctions are fundamentally flawed
because the individual is, in part, a creation of the community.14 Thus, in
8. See id. at 2761 (plurality opinion).
9. See id.
10. Until recently, this term had received little extended attention in the scholarly
literature. For an illuminating discussion remedying that gap, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267 (2007).
11. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752.
12. See id. at 2834-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13. While this Article concentrates on the de jure/de facto distinction, another
litigation strategy should also be noted. Justice Kennedy (whose vote was decisive)
would rule that a school district facing a challenge to the use of race in assigning students
can prevail by showing either (a) that the program is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("when de facto discrimination is at issue ... [t]he State must seek
alternatives to the classification and differential treatment of individuals by race, at least
absent some extraordinary showing not present here"), or (b) that it is justified as a
remedy for de jure segregation, see id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The two are
analytically distinct, in that (a) does not require a showing of de jure segregation, while
(b) does not require a compelling state interest.
In this Article, I put aside (a) in order to focus on (b), the "remedy for de jure
segregation" theory.
14. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 150 (stating that for members of a community,
2008] 1025
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
The Partial Constitution, Cass Sunstein questions the distinction the
Court draws between state and private action. 5 Rather than identifying
separate realms of government and private behavior, he maintains that
the Court picks and chooses among government activities, labeling some
of them state action and others not, depending on whether a given
activity falls on one side or the other of "a particular baseline,
establishing the normal natural, or desirable functions of government.'
16
Unsurprisingly, he goes on to reject the distinction between de jure and
de facto discrimination. 17 For this reason, he and other communitarians
would likely disapprove of the sharp de jure/de facto distinction drawn
by the Parents Involved majority and endorse Justice Breyer's dissenting
view.
Taking Parents Involved as a starting point, this Article looks ahead
to the future of litigation over student assignment plans. By striking
down the Seattle and Louisville plans, the decision may "require
hundreds of school districts to rethink race-based policies that they use
voluntarily to desegregate schools."' 8  At the very least, the 5-4 ruling
almost certainly did not put an end to race-conscious integration plans or
to the filing of challenges against them, 19 for Justice Kennedy gave only
qualified support to the ruling against these plans.20  Justice Roberts'
plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy's separate opinion, and Justice
Breyer's dissent all discuss the relevance of the de jure/de facto
"community describes not just what they have as fellow citizens but also what they
are,.., not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity.").
15. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 72 (1993).
16. Id.
17. See id. at 79-80 (stating that the distinction "rests on artificial premises," as
"[t]he notion of de facto segregation suggests that segregation simply happened; it is just
'there."').
18. Jess Bravin & Daniel Golden, Court Restricts How Districts Integrate Schools,
WALL ST. J., June 29, 2007, at A10. See also Joseph Pereira, School Integration Efforts
Face Renewed Opposition, WALL ST. J., October 11, 2007, at Al. The latter article is
mainly concerned with resistance to school integration efforts in Milton, Massachusetts.
Despite newspaper accounts like these, it is not at all clear that the ruling will have much
direct effect on efforts to integrate public schools. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 146-47 ("I
count fewer than thirty districts that have plans similar to those in effect in Seattle and
Louisville, where students are given a broad choice among regular public schools and
where that choice is constrained by racial guidelines. The number may be as low as
ten.") (footnotes omitted).
19. See Tamar Lewin, Across U.S., a New Look at School Integration Efforts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2007 at A 19 (reporting that, after Parents Involved, "[m]any lawyers said
the 5-to-4 ruling would not end a half century of litigation over school desegregation but
rather reignite it, as school districts turn to alternative methods for achieving diversity.").
20. See Michael J. Kaufman, PICS in Focus: A Majority of the Supreme Court
Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious School Integration Strategies, 35
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that on the critical question of whether race
may be taken into account at all, Justice Kennedy would join the four dissenters).
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distinction to race-conscious integration plans like those adopted in
Seattle and Louisville.2 ' The plurality, led by Chief Justice Roberts, took
the view that the absence of a current desegregation order in either
system distinguished these cases from precedents authorizing race-
conscious remedies for de jure segregation.22 For the dissenters, the
history of litigation over efforts to integrate the schools in the two cities
was sufficient to render the de jure/de facto distinction "meaningless in
the present context,, 23 Justice Kennedy avoided the issue by simply
noting that "[t]he cases here were argued upon the assumption, and come
to us on the premise, that the discrimination in question did not result
from de jure actions. 24
The issues left open by Parents Involved are illustrated by the
following hypothetical. Suppose a school district adopts a race-
conscious student assignment plan even though it is not obliged to do so
by a current court order to desegregate the schools. When the scheme is
challenged, the school district attempts to defend its plan by showing a
history of government involvement in maintaining segregated schools.
We know from Parents Involved that, barring a change of mind, there are
four votes on either side of this issue.25 Justice Kennedy's position is
critical. 26 Would Justice Kennedy join the Roberts' wing, rejecting race-
conscious remedies absent a current order, or would he, on another set of
facts, join Justice Breyer to form a new majority? Can a convincing case
be made for a more flexible approach to the whole matter of prior
government involvement, one that borrows from the views expressed by
Justice Breyer and the other dissenters, but does not fully adopt them?
In this Article, I argue for a more flexible approach and offer
grounds on which Justice Kennedy, and perhaps others, may be
persuaded to reject the uncompromising Roberts position without
careening all the way over to the Breyer view. The core proposition I
advance is that the de jure/de facto distinction serves as the Court's tool
for distinguishing between state and private action in the school
integration context. As in other state action cases, the constitutional
values at stake on either side of the de jure/de facto issue are, on one
side, (a) the constitutional principles served by extending constitutional
restraints into the arguably private sphere, and, on the other side, (b) the
21. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2741-2768 (2007) (plurality opinion); id. at 2788-2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
2800-2837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at 2761-62 (plurality opinion).
23. Id. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25. See generally Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
26. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 136-37 (explaining the importance of Justice
Kennedy's views going forward).
2008] 1027
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
value of maintaining a private sphere free of legal constraints on private
behavior.27
This Article argues that none of the Justices in Parents Involved
adequately addressed the task of ranking and accommodating these
competing constitutional values. Looking ahead, in future student
assignment cases, it further contends that these values would be better
served by a less categorical approach. The Court ought to steer a middle
course between the positions taken by the plurality and Justice Breyer.
This Article identifies a number of factors, ignored by all the opinions in
Parents Involved, that should guide the Court in constructing such a
doctrine in this area. I suggest, for example, that a distinction could have
been drawn between the Louisville case, in which there had been an
earlier finding of de jure segregation,2 8 and the Seattle case, in which
there had never been such a finding.29 Though the court order mandating
integration had since been lifted in Louisville,30 the history provides
strong support for approving the current voluntary race-conscious plan. I
also defend Justice Kennedy's distinction between race-conscious
programs that target specific individuals and those that address school
siting, attendance zones, and other such measures.
31
More specifically, Part I discusses the historical and analytical
foundations of the de jure/de facto distinction. The distinction serves
two aims: to enforce the Court's substantive equal protection principle
that only purposive discrimination violates equal protection,32 and to
separate cases where there is sufficient state action to warrant a finding
of constitutional illegality from those where there is not. Part II
examines the Justices' treatment of the de jure/de facto distinction in the
various Parents Involved opinions. For all the bitter disagreements
among them, the Justices seem to share a common faulty premise. All
ignore the roots of the distinction in the flexible, context-specific state
action doctrine, treating it instead as a kind of switch that is either turned
on or off. Starting from the premise that the de jure/de facto distinction
operates, in part, as a means of implementing the state action
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part III raises objections to
both the majority's bright-line de jure/de facto distinction and the
dissent's refusal to draw any distinction at all. My aim is to show that
there are grounds for Justice Kennedy, and perhaps other Justices as
27. See infra Part IV.
28. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749.
29. Id. at 2747.
30. Id. at 2749.
31. See id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 58-62.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 63-72.
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well, to take a less rigid approach in future cases. Part IV proposes such
a middle course, arguing that a range of policy considerations should be
brought to bear on the issue of whether the segregation in a given school
district should be characterized as de jure or de facto. Accordingly,
Justice Breyer is right to reject the plurality's crude version of the de
jure/de facto distinction, but he goes too far in arguing that the
distinction is "meaningless." There are good reasons to distinguish
between state and private action, even in the school segregation context,
and some of these may support at least part of the outcome in Parents
Involved, if not the plurality's reasoning.
1. The De Jure/De Facto Distinction
A. Doctrinal Foundations
In the Court's lexicon, the term de jure refers to segregation brought
about by state action undertaken with the aim of achieving or
maintaining segregation.34 De facto signifies segregation that is the
product of housing patterns or general societal discrimination rather than
deliberate acts by government.35 Thus, "the differentiating factor
between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ... is
purpose or intent to segregate. 36 A finding of de jure segregation may
be crucial to upholding a race-conscious program. The black letter rule
is that, without any further special justification, race-conscious remedies
may be imposed to root out de jure segregation, but not the de facto
version.37 The significance of state responsibility for segregation has
deep roots in the law of school integration. Brown v. Board of Education
established that governments violate the Equal Protection Clause when
they purposely segregate the public schools by race.38 Green v. County
School Board39  and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education40 held that governments found to have practiced de jure
segregation must do more than stop their illegal practices. They are also
34. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 474 (1992) ("under the former dejure
regimes racial exclusion was both the means and the end of a policy motivated by
disparagement of, or hostility towards, the disfavored race.").
35. See 127 S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973)
(emphasis added).
37. As for race-conscious plans where the segregation is de facto, the plan must
serve a compelling state interest and survive strict scrutiny. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
38. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
39. 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
40. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
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obliged to "eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-
imposed segregation,"' and if they "fail in their affirmative
obligations ... the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy
past wrongs is broad., 42  Swann held that this power may include
imposing such race-conscious remedies as busing students across the
school district in order to achieve integration.43
Up to this point, the Court had left open the legality of "de facto
segregation-racial imbalance resulting merely from adherence to the
traditional, racially neutral, neighborhood school policy in a community
marked by racially segregated residential patterns." 4  Keyes v. School
District No. 145 answered this question by distinguishing between the
constitutional status of de jure and de facto segregation. Keyes states that
the plaintiff can win by showing de jure segregation in part of a school
system without "proving the elements of de jure segregation as to each
and every school or each and every student within the school system.
46
This reasoning implies that de facto segregation would not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Later cases confirm this reading of the Keyes,
ruling that court orders against school districts that had purposely
segregated students in the past should be lifted or modified once
remedial efforts have eliminated the vestiges of the prior de jure
segregation.47
In Parents Involved, both the plurality and Justice Kennedy relied
on the de jure/de facto distinction. Chief Justice Roberts' plurality
opinion observed that "[t]he distinction between segregation by state
action and racial imbalance caused by other factors has been central to
our jurisprudence in this area for generations., 48 Because the latter "does
not have constitutional implications, 4 9 cases upholding race-conscious
measures to remedy judicial findings of de jure segregation had no
bearing on the plans challenged in Parents Involved. Justice Kennedy
considered "the difference between de jure and de facto segregation" to
be "of central importance for determining the validity of laws and
decrees designed to alleviate the hurt and adverse consequences resulting
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 22-3 1.
44. Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275, 275 (1972).
45. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
46. Id. at 200.
47. See e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237, 246-51 (1991).
48. 127 S. Ct. at 2761 (plurality opinion).
49. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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from race discrimination." 50  He noted that prior cases "recognized a
fundamental difference between those school districts that had engaged
in de jure segregation and those whose segregation was the result of
other factors. School districts that had engaged in de jure segregation
had an affirmative constitutional duty to desegregate; those that were de
facto segregated did not."'', Since "the remedial rules are different" for
de facto discrimination, "[t]he State must seek alternatives to the
classification and differential treatment of individuals by race, at least
absent some extraordinary showing not present here. 52 Justice Kennedy
went on to explain that in de facto cases the government must show that
its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interests in
diversity and in avoiding racial isolation.53
By contrast, Justice Breyer questioned the normative force of the de
jure/de facto distinction in evaluating the Seattle and Louisville plans.
He called attention to the complex racial histories of these cities.54 In
both school districts, the systems were highly segregated in fact for a
long time. 55 The segregation was the result of a combination of factors,
some governmental and some not.56 These histories rendered the de
jure/de facto distinction "meaningless in the present context, thereby
dooming the plurality's endeavor to find support for its views in that
distinction.,
57
B. Policies Underlying the De Jure/De Facto Distinction
The de jure/de facto distinction rests on two separate rationales.
One rationale derives from the "purpose to discriminate" rule set forth in
Washington v. Davis.58 In that case the Court rejected the notion that
racially discriminatory effects of government policy violate equal
protection. 59 The challenger must show a purpose to discriminate on the
basis of race.60 Though Davis was decided four years after Keyes, it is
nonetheless appropriate to link the "purpose to discriminate" rule and the
de jure/de facto distinction. In fact, the Court did so in Davis itself,
citing Keyes along with other cases as authority for the "purpose"
50. Id. at 2794 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
53. See id. at 2796-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 2802-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2802-07 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2802-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
59. Id. at 242.
60. See id. at 239.
10312008]
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doctrine. 6  Davis characterized Keyes as a case in which the Court
emphasized that "the differentiating factor between De jure segregation
and so-called De facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to
segregate."
62
The role of de jure/de facto in school segregation doctrine cannot be
justified solely as a means of enforcing the "discriminatory purpose"
rule, however. The Court's rulings indicate that the distinction serves
another purpose as well, though one that is less clearly articulated in the
opinions. In Keyes, the Court recognized that a showing of purpose to
discriminate is not sufficient to establish current de jure segregation.63
The reason is that "at some point in time the relationship between past
segregative acts and present segregation may become so attenuated as to
be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure segregation warranting
judicial intervention. 64
Another group of school segregation cases drive this point home.
These cases deal with requests by school districts to dissolve or modify
desegregation decrees entered many years ago. In Freeman v. Pitts, the
Court held that a decree may be modified upon a showing of faithful
compliance, even though vestiges of de jure segregation remain.65
Echoing Keyes, the Court reasoned that as the causal link between a past
purpose to discriminate and current segregation grows more attenuated,
the case for continued judicial supervision weakens.66 The reason it
grows weaker cannot be found within the logic of the discriminatory
purpose rule, for in all cases of this type a court has, at some point in the
past, already identified a discriminatory purpose. Rather, the problem is
that with the passage of time remedial measures have done their work,
conditions have changed, and other factors now count more in explaining
current segregation. Since the constitutional claim may fail on de facto
grounds even if the purpose requirement is satisfied, the de jure/de facto
distinction must rest, in part, on some other rationale.
Besides signaling "discriminatory purpose," the de jure/de facto
distinction is the Court's tool for enforcing the "state action" doctrine in
the school segregation context. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state may deny equal protection to any person.67 That language
has given rise to a complex doctrine separating state action from private
61. Id. at 240.
62. Id. at 240 (citing Keyes, 413 U.S. 189, 208) (emphasis added).
63. 413 U.S. 189, 208.
64. Id. at 211.
65. 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992); see also Bd. ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991)
(addressing similar issue).
66. Id. at 495-96.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
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conduct. Beginning from the language and purposes of the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has held that all but a few
constitutional rights are held only against governments and not against
private individuals. 68 That principle in turn gives rise to a need to mark
the boundaries between consequences properly attributable to private
conduct and those for which the state is responsible. For example,
Freeman said that "[w]here resegregation is a product not of state action
but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications. 69
This is so even if the state has in the past purposely segregated the public
schools. It appears that a case may fall on the de facto side of the
distinction even if, but for earlier purposive segregation, the schools
would not be segregated today. Freeman's stress on the "attenuated"
link between earlier purposive acts and current segregation implies that
the reason advocates of continued supervision lose is not the lack of a
"but for" link.70 Analogizing to tort law, the Court requires not merely
"but for" causation but proximate causation as well. Thus, "[t]he school
district bears the burden of showing that any current imbalance is not
traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation.",71 In other words,
the imbalance must be linked to the state in some meaningful way.
Importantly, fixing meaningful links between state conduct and
significant injury is precisely the work the state action doctrine performs
in other areas of constitutional law.72
II. Proving De Jure Segregation
None of the Justices in Parents Involved dispute the purposeful
discrimination rule or the need for a link between purposeful
discrimination and current segregation in order to justify a race-
68. The only unambiguous counterexample is the Thirteenth Amendment, which
forbids private slavery as well as state-sponsored slavery. See Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (Thirteenth Amendment forbids slavery whether it is state-sponsored or
not). For a recent affirmation of this point, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
69. 503 U.S. at 495.
70. See id. at 496 ("As the dejure violation becomes more remote in time and these
demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial imbalance in a
school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system. The causal link between current
conditions and the prior violation is even more attenuated if the school district has
demonstrated its good faith.").
71. Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
72. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) ("[wlhat is fairly attributable [to the State] is a matter of normative judgment, and
the criteria lack rigid simplicity."). See also Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in
Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the Role of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
99, 107-11 (arguing for this view of state action).
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conscious plan.73 The hard question raised in cases like Parents Involved
is one that both tort theory and Freeman would call a proximate cause
issue: just how substantial does the link need to be in order to prove de
jure segregation? Accordingly, in what follows I put aside the
purposeful discrimination requirement for the sake of concentrating on
the "proximate cause" question that divided the Court in Parents
Involved. In examining this issue, it is helpful to first distinguish
between the two school districts, for they faced somewhat different
hurdles. With regard to Seattle, there had been no judicial finding of de
jure segregation.7 4 As for Louisville, in 1975 a federal court ruled that
the school district had engaged in de jure segregation and enjoined the
school district to take remedial action.7 5 The order was lifted in 2000,
upon a determination by the federal judge overseeing the school district's
desegregation efforts that the effects of prior discriminatory practices had
been eliminated.76 The de jure/de facto issue was whether, in these
circumstances, the school districts could defend their plans under the
principle that race-conscious remedies may be employed as a remedy for
de jure segregation.
A. How the Justices Divided in Parents Involved
For Justice Roberts the lack of a judicial finding of de jure
segregation in Seattle and the judicial determination that "Jefferson
County had eliminated the vestiges of prior segregation" sufficed to
show that the cases involved only de facto segregation.77 Justice
Kennedy agreed with this conclusion, but gave a subtly different reason.
For him, it was enough that "[t]he cases here were argued upon the
assumption and came to us on the premise that the discrimination in
question did not result from de jure segregation., 78  Justice Breyer's
dissent took issue with the majority's distinction between de jure and de
facto segregation. 79 Despite the lack of lower court findings of de jure
segregation, he would have decided the Louisville and Seattle cases by
following precedents that approved race-conscious remedies for de jure
segregation. Both cities "began with schools that were highly segregated
in fact." 80  A federal court had already found de jure segregation in
73. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007).
74. Id. at 2747.
75. Id. at 2749.
76. See id. at 2761 (plurality opinion); id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 2761 (plurality opinion).
78. Id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
79. Id. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Louisville, though the decree was dissolved some years later. 81 In
Seattle, there was no judicial finding of de jure segregation, but plaintiffs
in earlier litigation had made an allegation to that effect, and "the parties
settled after the school district pledged to undertake a desegregation
plan." 82  Each city had thereafter undertaken desegregation plans that
included race-conscious elements. Despite the lifting of the Louisville
order, Justice Breyer treated the earlier finding of de jure segregation as a
sufficient ground for questioning the utility of the de jure/de facto
distinction in this setting.83 As for the Seattle plan, Breyer explained that
it was only happenstance of the earlier litigation that "a prior federal
court had not adjudicated the matter,, 84 which justified treating it as de
jure segregation. 85 He concluded that the histories of both cities "make
clear the futility of looking simply to whether earlier school segregation
was de jure or de facto in order to draw firm lines separating the
constitutionally permissible from the constitutionally forbidden use of
'race-conscious' criteria., 86
The dispute between the majority and dissenting justices in Parents
Involved boils down to the question of what kind of evidence a school
district must present in order to establish the "state-sponsored
segregation" predicate for approval of a race-conscious remedy. The
specific issue that divided the Justices can be restated in narrower terms
than the ones the Justices employed: in order to meet the state action
requirement, does the school district have to show (a) a judicial finding
of (b) current purposeful segregation? One might hold that (a) is
necessary but (b) is not, in which case the Louisville plan would
withstand scrutiny but Seattle's would fail.87 The plurality implicitly
took the view that both (a) and (b) are needed. 88 The dissent would
require neither.89
Justice Kennedy's position is less clear. He may agree with the
81. See id. at 2806-09 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2802-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 2810 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("No one here disputes that Louisville's
segregation was dejure.").
84. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer makes the point indirectly, by means
of a series of rhetorical questions: "No one here disputes that Louisville's segregation
was dejure. But what about Seattle's? Was it defacto? Dejure? A mixture? Opinions
differed. Or is it that a prior federal court had not adjudicated the matter? Does that
make a difference? Is Seattle free on remand to say that its schools were de jure
segregated, just as in 1956 a memo for the School Board admitted?").
85. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Of course, the second defensive strategy-showing that a plan is narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interests-would still be available to Seattle.
88. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2756-57 (plurality opinion).
89. See id. at 2816 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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plurality, as he expresses strong approval of the de jure/de facto
distinction.90 Yet the reason he gives for characterizing the segregation
as de facto is a wholly formal one. He states that "[t]he cases here were
argued upon the assumption, and come to us on the premise, that the
discrimination in question did not result from de jure actions."9' What is
more, he declares that "[w]here there has been de jure segregation, there
is a cognizable legal wrong, and the courts and legislatures have broad
power to remedy it."'92  Admittedly, the quoted language is not
necessarily inconsistent with Chief Justice Roberts' demand for a prior
judicial finding of purposeful discrimination before a legislature
undertakes a race-conscious remedy. But the language-and particularly
its reference to what "legislatures" may do if there has "been" unlawful
discrimination-permits another reading. Justice Kennedy may mean to
say that no prior judicial finding is needed in order to trigger the "remedy
for state-sponsored segregation" theory, so long as a school district
defending its plan against a challenge it offers sufficient proof of past
purposeful discrimination.
This way of reading Justice Kennedy's statement finds support
elsewhere in his opinion. Justice Kennedy points out that "[t]he
distinction between government and private action.., can be amorphous
both as a historical matter and as a matter of present-day finding of
fact.",9 3 Moreover, he cites Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,94 as a case that
"reinforced the difference between the remedies available to redress de
facto and de jure discrimination., 95 In evaluating race-conscious city
contracting rules, Croson distinguished between plans intended to
overcome "societal discrimination" (which would face an especially high
hurdle) and discrimination in which the government was a passive
participant (which would more easily survive an equal protection
challenge).96 The crucial point for present purposes is that Croson did
not require a prior judicial finding that government had participated in
the discrimination as a predicate for assigning a plan to the latter rather
than the former category.97
90. See id. at 2795-96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 2795. See also Heather Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of
Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REv. 104, 115 (2007) (arguing that, in this passage and
the sentences that surround it, Justice Kennedy "concedes that it is impossible to draw a
clear line between de jure and de facto discrimination and admits that the distinction is a
useful legal fiction.").
94. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
95. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. See 488 U.S. at 497.
97. The key part of Justice O'Connor's opinion is Part III.B., 488 U.S. at 498-506,
which won support from a majority of the Justices, including Justice Kennedy. Croson
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B. The Prior Cases
Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer claimed that
precedent favored their positions. Justice Breyer attacks the notion that
race-conscious measures cannot be upheld absent a judicial finding of
current de jure segregation. 98 His reasoning begins with Louisville then
moves to Seattle. 99 First, he rejects the proposition that dissolution of the
Louisville injunction justifies shifting Louisville from the de jure to the
de facto hopper. 10 0 In so doing, the dissenters implicitly question the
Court's holdings that earlier desegregation decrees should be dissolved
or modified when the effects of prior purposive segregation policies have
become sufficiently "attenuated. '" 10 1  Second, with regard to Seattle,
Justice Breyer gives little weight to the lack of a judicial finding of de
jure segregation. °2 For support Justice Breyer relies on Swann,'0 3 where
the Court said, in dicta:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well
conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a
whole. To do this as educational policy is within the broad
discretionary powers of school authorities. 
104
McDaniel v. Barresi,10 5 a case handed down the same day as Swann,
provided more ammunition for Justice Breyer's thesis. 0 6 In McDaniel,
the Court approved the use of race-conscious measures to achieve
desegregation efforts adopted in Clarke County, Georgia, without a prior
judicial finding of de jure segregation.10 7 Justice Breyer reasons that
Seattle should be permitted to do the same. In summary, the dissenters
would hold in the Louisville case that the difference between a system
did of course require that the city produce convincing evidence of earlier government
involvement in discrimination. See 488 U.S. at 500 ("when a legislative body chooses to
employ a suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to the
classification's relevance to its goals."). At the same time, Croson held that race-
conscious remedies could be employed without a prior judicial finding of wrongdoing.
See id. at 509.
98. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 2801-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 2811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992).
102. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2810 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 2811-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
105. 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
106. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2812 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. See McDaniel, 402 U.S. at 41-42.
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that is currently under federal judicial supervision pursuant to a
desegregation order and one that has been under such supervision earlier
is vanishingly small. As for Seattle, the difference between a system that
a court has found to be de jure segregated and one that has avoided the
chance of such a finding by settling the lawsuit is, for the dissenters,
equally insubstantial. This approach serves to blur, if not ignore, the de
jure/de facto distinction.
While Justice Breyer felt no need to maintain a strong de jure/de
facto distinction, Chief Justice Roberts' plurality opinion puts great
weight upon it, 108 perhaps more than it can bear. With regard to Seattle,
he points out that the above-quoted passage from Swann is dicta,109 and
that in McDaniel "there was no doubt that the county had operated a
'dual school system,"' so that a race-conscious remedy was appropriate
under settled doctrine. 0 Turning to Louisville, he criticizes Justice
Breyer for having "fail[ed] to credit the judicial determination-under
the most rigorous standard-that Jefferson County had eliminated the
vestiges of prior segregation." '111
III. State-Action Doctrine and the De Jure/De Facto Distinction
A fair assessment of the early cases surveyed by Justice Breyer is
that in deciding them the Court took for granted that Southern school
districts in the Jim Crow era practiced de jure segregation.' 12 In the early
cases, the Court was preoccupied with undoing a century of state-
sponsored white supremacy and did not give much, if any, thought to the
108. See id. at 2761 (plurality opinion).
109. See id. at 2762.
110. Id. at 2761. Justice Roberts does not seem to reconcile his treatment of
McDaniel with his earlier insistence that only the existence of a current judicial order
would support "the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination." Id. at 2752.
111. Id. at 2761. The disagreement between the Parents Involved plurality and
dissenters reflects general disarray in the affirmative action cases as to the role of
remedial findings. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting
Fundamental Values With Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1575, 1670-75 (2001). He concludes that the "affirmative action decisions have
left in their wake a host of doctrinal uncertainties," and that "none of the cases spells out
definitively when or how remedy-supporting findings must be made." Id. at 1674.
112. See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 131, 137 (2007). According to Professor Ryan, "at the time of Swann anyone trying
to describe the 'law' would have concluded with a great deal of confidence that
voluntarily seeking to achieve a racial balance in schools was perfectly constitutional."
Id. No doubt this is true. Nonetheless, two years later in Keyes, the Court cast doubt on
that description by drawing, for the first time, the de jure/de facto distinction. See Keyes
v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). With that distinction
in place, it became possible to argue that the validity of race-conscious assignment turned
on whether the segregation was de jure or de facto.
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validity of race-conscious plans adopted decades later in circumstances
like those in Louisville and Seattle. Before Parents Involved, the Court
had not decided whether the de jure requirement could be met by linking
current school segregation in cities with histories like Louisville and
Seattle to earlier government support for segregation. The issue remains
open after the 4-4 split between the plurality and the dissent, combined
with Justice Kennedy's equivocal opinion.
The normative issue of how to define the scope of de jure
segregation as a matter of constitutional principle deserves attention, for
it will surely resurface in future cases. Furthermore, at least one crucial
vote-that of Justice Kennedy-remains up for grabs. Perhaps other
Justices can be persuaded to consider the problem more carefully than
they may have in Parents Involved, particularly because the issue was
not squarely presented by the litigants in that case or considered in the
lower court opinions.
A. De Jure Segregation as State Action
The "proximate cause" prong of the de jure requirement turns on
whether segregation can be fairly attributed to the state, even though the
state's purposive discrimination took place in the more or less distant
past. For the sake of identifying the issue that divides the plurality and
the dissent in Parents Involved, it is helpful to begin with three possible
responses to this question: "always,' ''never," and "sometimes."
Freeman v. Pitts" 3 strongly implies that the Court's answer is not
"always." There the Court upheld a lower court's decision to partially
relinquish judicial control of a school system that had been subject to a
desegregation order for some years."l 4 The Court explained that "[o]nce
the racial imbalance due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the
school district is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by
demographic factors."' ' 5 The plurality in Parents Involved seems to
believe the answer is "never. ' 1 6 The dissent may believe that, despite
Freeman, the answer is "always," and certainly would endorse
",sometimes."''17
Caution is called for in ascribing a definitive answer to this question
113. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
114. Seeid.at471.
115. Id. at 494.
116. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2761 (2007).
117. See id. at 2810-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Freeman is not necessarily to the
contrary. That the school district is "under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by
demographic factors," Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992), does not compel the
conclusion that the school district is precluded from undertaking such a project.
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to either the plurality or dissent, because neither group gave reasons for
its choice. We know how they come out in Parents Involved, but
without more explanation it is impossible to know how a somewhat
different case would be resolved. The lack of explanation is typical of
cases on the de jure/de facto distinction. Over the past thirty-five years,
the de jure/de facto principle has received only fragmentary attention
from the Supreme Court. Nowhere in the case law is there a systematic
analysis of this principle that sets forth a comprehensive rationale for
dividing the cases up in this way or a set of rules for assigning cases to
one category or the other.
For this reason, one must look outside the de jure/de facto cases to
understand what is at stake in Parents Involved and similar cases and
what considerations bear on their proper resolution. A basic problem
with the Court's "de jure/de facto" vocabulary in school-related race
cases is that it obscures the close kinship of the "state responsibility"
aspect of the de jure/de facto principle and the more general "state
action" principle that lies at the heart of constitutional law. Indeed, in
almost all cases other than school race cases-whether they arise under
the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause, or other clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment-the Court usually analyzes these state responsibility
problems under the doctrinal rubric of state action.'
18
The point is not that state action doctrine pays no attention to
doctrinal context. On the contrary, each substantive context, including
school segregation, gives rise to distinctive state action issues.
Nonetheless, we have a general framework of state action doctrine and a
set of policy considerations that help guide state action analysis. Given
the Court's inattention to the distinctive state-action concerns that crop
up in school segregation cases, there is a need to shed light on those
concerns, bring them to bear on the equal protection issues that will
likely arise in future student assignment litigation, and thereby offer aid
to courts obliged to struggle with the application of the de jure/de facto
distinction going forward.
B. Interest Balancing and State Action
In my view, the plurality in Parents Involved, with its crisp
distinction between situations in which de jure segregation may or may
not be found, fails to take account of the full range of considerations
bearing on whether the state action requirement can be met in cases of
this type. Justice Breyer's dissent, with its willingness to find the
118. See Wells, supra note 72 (for discussion of such cases).
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requisite state action in the mere fact that Seattle settled litigation against
it years ago, may commit the same error."t 9  In effect, the two sides
disagree about (a) how much state action is needed to trigger application
of the Fourteenth Amendment and (b) whether the finding of state action
needs to be made in the first instance by a court. For the dissent,
virtually any indication of past purposeful discrimination suffices,
including claims of state action made in earlier litigation that did not
result in a judgment or any other judicial determination. 120  For the
plurality, nothing short of a judicial finding of current purposeful
discrimination seems sufficient.'
For all their differences, the two sides seem to share a common
premise: that "state action" is a thing or quality that can be separated
from the substantive dispute and that may or may not be present in
sufficient quantity. Both Justice Breyer's argument 122 and the responses
from Chief Justice Roberts 123 and Justice Kennedy 2 4 reflect this
recurring theme in state action doctrine. Kathleen Sullivan and Gerald
Gunther report that, for at least the past fifty years, "most of the cases are
preoccupied with the search for adequate elements of the 'state. '' ' 25 For
example, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, the Court said that there is an
"essential dichotomy" between state and private action,' 26 and in some of
its post-Moose Lodge cases it tried to make sharp distinctions between
the two. 127 The majority's treatment of the de jure/de facto distinction in
Parents Involved echoes this theme.1
28
Though several cases can be cited as authority for the "essential
119. Justice Breyer's reasoning does, however, leave open the possibility that he
favors a more flexible approach. In this regard it is noteworthy that Justice Breyer wrote
the Court's opinion in Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531
U.S. 288 (2001), where the Court said that "[w]hat is fairly attributable [to the state] is a
matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity." Id. at 295.
120. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2803-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 2761 (plurality opinion).
122. See id. at 2835 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 2761 (plurality opinion).
124. See id. at 2796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. Kathleen Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 893 (15th ed. 2004).
See, e.g., Tulsa Prof'l Collection Serv. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (holding
that "[pirivate use of state sanctioned private remedies.., does not rise to the level of
state action.") (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
127. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (school that receives over
90% of its funding from the state is not a state actor); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouseman's sale of property belonging to another is not state
action).
128. See 127 S. Ct. at 2752 (treating the de jure/de facto distinction as a sharp line
between situations in which there is a current court order finding state-sponsored
segregation and situations in which there is no current court order to that effect).
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dichotomy" approach to state action, 29 the effort to draw such
distinctions ignores the purpose of the state action doctrine and
misconceives the state action inquiry. By restricting the scope of
constitutional guarantees, the state action doctrine "preserves an area of
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids
imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct
for which they cannot fairly be blamed.' 30 In more abstract terms, the
state action problem is this: on the one hand, in every case that raises a
state action issue, someone seeks to assert a constitutional right, and
some of the values underpinning that right would be served by extending
"state action" to cover the situation at hand. On the other hand, the party
resisting the effort to extend the reach of "state action" asserts
constitutional values as well. Usually private individuals or entities rely
on the constitutional value of liberty, which is preserved by limiting the
scope of judicial interference with their affairs. The Court must choose
between the two, on a context-by-context basis.'31
As Professor Frederick Schauer has observed, state action "[is]
not.., a descriptive term intended to be taken literally, but ... the label
for the conclusion reached after the decision not to decide in a certain
category of cases.' 3 2  Some cases recognize this more clearly than
others. For example, in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association the Court wisely avoided recourse to the
"essential dichotomy" rhetoric of some earlier opinions. 133 Instead, it
recognized that the "ambit [of the Fourteenth Amendment] cannot be a
simple line between States and people operating outside formally
governmental organizations, and the deed of an ostensibly private
organization or individual is to be treated sometimes as if a State had
caused it to be performed."' 34 Competing constitutional values are at
stake in state action cases, and outcomes depend on "normative
judgment" among them.' 35 The aim of the doctrine is not to distinguish
one level of state involvement from another, but to determine which set
of values-those served by extending a constitutional provision or those
129. See Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 172; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., Inc.,
365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
130. Edmondson v. Lecsville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). See also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
131. See Wells, supra note 72, at 109-10 (describing the value choices demanded by
state action cases).
132. Frederick Schauer, Acts, Omissions, and Constitutionalism, 105 Ethics 916, 922
(1995).
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furthered by curbing its reach-should prevail in a given set of
circumstances.
If the Parents Involved plurality means to assert that the state is not
present in the case absent a judicial finding of purposive discrimination,
it ignores reality. The state is virtually always present in one way or
another, and the normative judgment summed up by "state action"
cannot turn on the purely procedural matter of whether a court has found
the requisite trigger.' 36 Consider, for example, the housing patterns that
are said to reflect de facto segregation. In fact, as Professor Ryan and
others have documented, "every level of government-local, state, and
federal-has... played an integral and underappreciated role in
fostering residential segregation by race, and there has never been a
concerted effort by courts or legislatures to remedy past housing
discrimination."'' 37 At the same time, the extent that Parents Involved
dissenters think that any state involvement is sufficient to satisfy the state
action principle, they too misunderstand the point of state action
doctrine.
Given the omnipresence of the state, the Court's primary goal in
state action cases should be to distinguish situations in which the
Constitution ought to govern from those that it ought not to reach.1
38
This analysis will prove challenging, for in any given case, "[w]hat is
fairly attributable" to the state "is a matter of normative judgment, and
the criteria lack rigid simplicity.' 39 Moreover, the state action doctrine
consists of an ongoing and highly contextual effort to draw governing
boundary lines. For example, the Court in Polk County v. Dodson rejects
"state action" status for the actions taken in litigation by a public
defender who is employed by the state. 40  By contrast, Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co. holds that peremptory challenges made by
136. Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on
Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 362-63 (1993). As Professor Alexander
explains:
All private actions take place against a background of laws and have a legal
status under those laws. Thus, private actions may be legally forbidden, legally
required or legally permitted. If they are legally permitted, moreover, that
permission can be cashed out in terms of legal prohibitions and legal
immunities. If we couple this fact about private actions-that they occur
against a background of various legal duties and immunities, which background
gives them their legal status-with another fact-that these various background
legal duties and immunities are paradigmatic "state action"--we come to the
conclusion that all private action implicates state action. Therefore, no case
involving a constitutional challenge can be lacking in state action.
Id.
137. Ryan, supra note 2, at 140-41. See also sources cited, id. at 141, n. 67.
138. See Alexander, supra note 136, at 364-65.
139. See Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295
140. 454U.S.312,322n.12(1981).
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lawyers for private litigations in civil litigation do constitute state action
when the challenges are based on race.141 The amount of state
involvement is higher in Dodson than in Edmondson, 42 but other factors
counted for more in these state action analyses. The strong equal
protection value asserted against race-based peremptory challenges
carried the day in Edmondson,143 while the independence of the public
defender proved decisive in Dodson. 1
44
Another pair of cases that shows the contextual nature of state
action is West v. Atkins and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn. Under West v.
Atkins a private doctor brought into a prison once a week to treat patients
is a state actor when a prisoner sues for bad care. 145  By contrast,
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn holds that a private school, financed almost
exclusively by public funds and serving students referred to it by the
public schools, is not a state actor for purposes of a suit brought by
former teachers, who were dismissed for criticizing school authorities.
146
The best explanation for the different outcomes in these two cases is that,
in the Court's view, the Eighth Amendment right asserted in Estelle v.
Gamble147 is so strong that it should extend to a comparatively broad
range of circumstances involving basic competence in the delivery of in-
prison care. 148  By contrast, the teachers' First Amendment rights to
criticize their employer deserve less weight, particularly when the
management of a significantly private entity is at stake. 149 The lesson of
these cases is that for state-action purposes, one constitutional right may
count for more than another.1
50
Other cases highlight the value of maintaining a private sphere.
Evans v. Abney151 rejected an equal protection challenge when a state
court allowed property, which had been donated to a city for a whites-
only park, to revert to the heirs on account of the impermissibility of city
operation of such a park.1 52 The Court found it decisive that the donation
141. 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991).
142. Compare generally Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 with Edmondson, 500 U.S. 614.
143. Edmondson, 500 U.S. at 616.
144. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321-22.
145. 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988).
146. 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982).
147. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
148. West, 487 U.S. at 54.
149. It is important here to separate the analytical framework from the Court's value
choices. One can accept the former without necessarily endorsing all of the Court's
judgments. For criticism of the holding in Rendell-Baker, see Wells, supra note 72, at
113-14.
150. See William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv.
3, 5-19 (1961).
151. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
152. See id. at 436.
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was the product of private choice by the testator.153 Thus, "the language
of the.., will shows that the racial restrictions were solely the product of
the testator's own full-blown social philosophy."'' 54 In Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 55 a six-Justice majority held that a private club that refused
to serve blacks was not a state actor on account of its state-issued liquor
license.1 56 Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the limited number of
liquor licenses made available by the state placed the club in a quasi-
monopolistic position. 157 He agreed with the majority, however, that
mere state licensure did not make the club a state actor, 58 because the
Bill of Rights "create[s] a zone of privacy which precludes government
from interfering with private clubs or groups."'
' 59
IV. Factors Bearing on the State Action Issues in Parents Involved
Cases like Edmonson, Dodson, and Moose Lodge illustrate the
balancing of substantive values that takes place in many state action
cases. By contrast, both sides in Parents Involved focused solely on the
history of litigation over segregation in the two cities. 60 In the dissent,
any trace of state involvement in segregation, including non-judicial
settlement of prior litigation in Seattle, seemed to suffice. 16' The
plurality, in stark contrast, insisted on a judicial finding of de jure
segregation and a current desegregation decree. 62 In future cases that
involve race-conscious remedies for school segregation, the aims of state
action doctrine would be better served by avoiding these two polar
extremes. Neither approach takes account of the full range of
considerations that bear on whether a state action exists in a given set of
circumstances.
More specifically, the majority looks no further than the acts of
officials currently in office when analyzing state action doctrine. 63 Yet
153. See id. at 444-46.
154. 396 U.S. at 445.
155. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
156. See id. at 177.
157. See id. at 182-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 180 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
160. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007).
161. See id. at 2809-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 2741-68 (plurality opinion).
163. See id. at 2752. Addressing the Louisville case, the Court acknowledged that
Jefferson County's practice of state-sponsored segregation justified the earlier mandatory
desegregation order. But it held that once the order was lifted, as it had been several
years ago, "Jefferson County had remedied the constitutional wrong that allowed race-
based assignments. Any continued use of race must be justified on some other basis."
Id.
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segregated housing patterns that account for segregated schools are often
themselves the product of government action, if their causes are traced
back far enough. Throughout the United States, governments authorized
and protected slavery from the Founding until the Civil War.' 64  For
another century, many states, and not exclusively Southern states,
enforced segregation in schools and elsewhere by force of law,' 65 and in
this way embedded racist attitudes in the collective psyche. No doubt the
passage of time dilutes some of the effects of slavery and its aftermath,
but the persistence of segregated housing patterns practically everywhere
(except the rural South) should give us pause.
On the other hand, the dissent in Parents Involved seems eager to
find that any trace of government involvement in segregation is enough
to warrant race-conscious remedies.166 The logic of the dissent, though
surely not its aim, would be to cast doubt on all state action limits on the
application of constitutional provisions to private actors. If any cause-in-
fact is enough to create state action, then virtually all cases finding a lack
of state action are called into question. In all areas of law, however,
proximate cause limits prevail. Whatever the past sins of governments,
and however strong the case for making up for them, there is also value
in maintaining a private sphere unencumbered by constitutional
constraints. 167 Throughout the history of the state action doctrine, that
value has been recognized by Justices across the ideological spectrum.1
68
To the extent the logic of the dissent would undermine general state
action principles, it should be rejected.
Unlike the all-or-nothing rules favored by both the plurality and the
dissent in Parents Involved, the balancing of interests framework directs
courts to pay close attention to the constitutional values on either side of
the state action issue in each particular case. The result would be an
approach to race-conscious student assignment plans that gives more
weight to the features of the scheme devised by the school district and
164. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 67-68 (1873) (describing slavery in the
antebellum period); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 536 (1842) (ruling that a federal law,
the Fugitive Slave Act, precluded Pennsylvania from punishing persons who recaptured
fugitive slaves).
165. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486-93, & nn. 1, 4 (1954) (describing
the practice of racial segregation in the public schools).
166. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2809-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
167. Keep in mind that, in the context of race-based remedies adopted by school
districts, the existence of constitutional constraints entails recognition of power on the
part of local authorities to use race in assigning students to public schools. From the
perspective of the individual who is told what to do, the basic objection to the practice
(and the corresponding argument for limits on the scope of remedial authority) is that
"[t]o be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity
of individuals in our society." 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168. See Wells, supra note 72, at 110-11 & n. 72 (collecting sources).
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draws more distinctions based on context. Below are some factors that,
under the "balancing of constitutional values" approach to state action,
may contribute to the resolution of future cases in which school districts
seek to defend race-conscious integration plans.
1 69
A. The Special Case of Race-Based Equal Protection
Since resolving state action cases requires making choices among
competing constitutional values, the substantive context in which a given
case arises should have considerable weight in deciding where to draw
the state-private line.1 70 An especially compelling constitutional value,
such as the principle of racial equality enforced by the Equal Protection
Clause, may well override libertarian arguments for individual autonomy
even in circumstances where a lesser constitutional privilege would not.
In this context, we have perhaps the strongest argument for Justice
Breyer's expansive view of state action in Parents Involved. Of all
constitutional issues, the Court has shown greater willingness to find
state action in race discrimination cases than in any other. The state
action cases thus support a presumption in favor of upholding race-
conscious student assignment plans, though perhaps not so strong a
presumption as Justice Breyer and his fellow dissenters seem to favor.
In Terry v. Adams, 17 1 for example, a racially-segregated private
group, calling themselves the "Jaybird Association," composed of a
select subgroup of the Democratic Party in Texas, chose candidates the
group would support in primary elections; the selected candidates
generally prevailed in those elections. 172 Since the Republican Party was
weak or non-existent at the time in Texas, the primary was, in effect, the
general election.1 73  The state was not formally present in the
arrangement, yet the Court found state action.' 74 It explained that "[f]or
a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to permit a
flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the Fifteenth
169. The list of contextual features I discuss here is hardly comprehensive. Others
also deserve attention. Cf Gerken, supra note 2, at 125-28 (distinguishing the "domain"
of school segregation from that of electoral districting; in the latter, Gerken argues, the
case for race-conscious remedies may be comparatively stronger).
170. See Wells, supra note 72, at 107-11 (discussing the impact of substantive context
in state action cases).
171. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
172. See id. at 463.
173. See id. at 469 ("The only election that has counted in this Texas county for more
than fifty years has been that held by the Jaybirds .. "); see also id. at 476 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("[I]n Texas nomination in the Democratic primary is tantamount to
election.").
174. See id. at 469-70 (plurality opinion).
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Amendment." 175 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority the Court
found state action in the symbiotic relationship between a city-owned
parking garage and a private coffee shop that leased space in the building
and that denied service to blacks. 176 In so ruling, the Court stressed the
reach of the Equal Protection Clause:
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws could
lie only in the breadth of its application, its constitutional assurance
was reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right
were to be enjoyed in the variety of individual-state relationships
which the Amendment was designed to embrace. For the same
reason, to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state
responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an impossible task
which [t]his Court has never attempted. Only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State
in private conduct be attributed its true significance.
177
It is noteworthy that the Court in Burton spoke pointedly of "state
responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause." Burton thus does not
establish, for example, that the coffee shop owner would be restrained by
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment in the treatment of his
employees and customers.
Terry and Burton show that the Equal Protection value of forbidding
the subordination of minority races 178 is an especially strong one in the
balancing of constitutional principles that is required to resolve state
action issues.179 As a result, these cases offer support for the proposition
that past government support for segregation can help to justify a current
plan to integrate the public schools by way of a race-conscious program.
Consequently, one could in principle defend a race-conscious program
like those in Louisville and Seattle without necessarily opening the door
to (as yet hypothetical) government programs that employ other suspect
or quasi-suspect classifications such as gender or non-marital
parentage. 180
175. Id. at 469.
176. 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961).
177. Id. at 722 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
178. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk. Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472-73 & n.8
(2004) (describing the "antisubordination principle" in Equal Protection law, which
Siegel defines as "the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that
enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups.").
179. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of a
covenant among property owners forbidding sale of property to a black person is state
action).
180. There are, of course, equal protection values on the other side of the ledger as
well. See infra Part IV.D.
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B. Judicial Determinations
Suppose that neither Justice Kennedy nor any member of the
Parents Involved plurality can be persuaded that the presumption of state
action in race cases is strong enough to broadly justify race-conscious
student assignment plans. In that event, other considerations come to the
fore. One of these is the history of a given school district. The majority
seems to assume that the level of state responsibility needed to sustain
judicial supervision of a school system under cases like Freeman v.
Pitts181 is identical to the level of state responsibility needed to justify a
school district's decision to undertake a race-conscious plan on its own
initiative.' 82 Yet there are grounds on which the two cases may be
distinguished.
While the two cases are alike in that both the judge and the school
district aim to further the constitutional values embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause,' 83 there are also striking differences between them.
When a court imposes a race-conscious plan or refuses to lift a plan
imposed earlier, its decision intrudes on other values to a greater extent
than when a school district adopts a plan on its own, and for this reason,
a state-imposed plan may require greater justification to pass
constitutional muster. A federal judicial order not only impinges on
private choice, but also displaces local legislative authority.' 84 No such
displacement takes place when a school district adopts a race-conscious
plan on its own. Once a court finds a violation, it must impose a remedy,
no matter how powerful the considerations are that cut against it. 185 By
contrast, political decision makers will be more likely to take these
countervailing factors into account, and the costs of these values are
correspondingly lower. As a result, it should be easier, other things
equal, to justify a finding that even a long-buried history of purposive
discrimination, or a subtle, hard-to-prove pattern of official support for
segregation, satisfies the "state action" requirement.
181. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 163.
183. Compare generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) with Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992).
184. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) ("Faithful
application of the state-action requirement in these cases ensures that the prerogative of
regulating private business remains with the States and the representative branches, not
the courts.").
185. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 485 ("The duty and responsibility of a school district
once segregated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the
unconstitutional de jure system."). The opinion goes on to delineate the various
dimensions of a school system and to reaffirm the power of the district courts "to fashion
remedies that address all these components of elementary and secondary school systems."
Id. at 486.
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Another distinction between the two cases also warrants
consideration. None of the Justices in Parents Involved seemed to
perceive any constitutionally significant differences between the Seattle
and Louisville plans. 86 Yet Seattle may deserve different treatment from
Louisville even if there is some purposive state involvement in the
segregation in both cities, as the dissenters argue,' 87 and even though, as
the plurality stresses, there is no current desegregation order in force in
either city. The 1975 judicial finding of purposive segregation furnishes
grounds for finding that Louisville more egregiously, or at least more
expressly, violated the anti-segregation value at the core of the Equal
Protection Clause. Accordingly, its race-conscious remedial plan could
be more readily defended. The link between earlier purposive
segregation and the current situation in Louisville may be too
"attenuated" to justify continued federal judicial supervision,188 but
nonetheless sufficiently strong to support the politically accountable
school district's race-conscious integration scheme.189  Justice Breyer
made a telling point when he observed that, under the majority's
reasoning, the race-conscious Louisville integration plan was
constitutionally sound the day before federal judicial supervision was
lifted and suddenly became illegal the next day.190 His point has force
because we intuitively accept that a proven history of purposive
segregation ought to carry weight, despite the majority's formal
reasoning to the contrary. No similar line of reasoning is available,
however, in support of the Seattle plan.
C. Distinguishing "Integration "from Core Equal Protection Values
Another factor to consider is the potentially significant difference
between race-conscious integration plans, like those at issue in Parents
Involved, and the exclusory practices that were repudiated in Burton and
Terry. The whites-only primary election in Terry and the whites-only
coffee shop in Burton were especially strong cases for extending the
reach of equal protection into the arguably private realm, because they
186. Although the Justices disagreed on many matters, none of the opinions draws
any constitutionally significant distinctions between the two systems. Compare Parents
Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2752 (where the majority lumps the Seattle and Louisville cases
together) with Parents Involved, 127. S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (where Justice
Breyer's dissent does so as well).
187. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2809 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494-96.
189. In this regard it is worth noting one likely consequence of the holding in Parents
Involved. A school district that is currently under a court order, and wishes to continue to
use race-conscious student assignment plans, may simply refrain from seeking to have
the order lifted. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 147-48.
190. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1050 [Vol. 112:4
RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS
concerned exclusion of blacks from the democratic process and from
public accommodations. Ever since Strauder v. West Virginia19 1 struck
down a law excluding blacks from service on juries, the Court has
recognized that putting an end to racial exclusion is the core value
enforced by the Equal Protection clause.
Neither the Seattle nor the Louisville case involved racial exclusion.
Black children were not kept out of any of the public schools in these
cities, nor were they, at least in 2007, precluded from attending school
with whites. Justice Breyer's opinion must look elsewhere for the
constitutional value by which to defend these race-conscious plans.
Repeatedly, he stresses the equal protection value of integration.' 92 He
states that these plans and others like them "represent local efforts to
bring about the kind of racially integrated education that Brown v. Board
of Education... long ago promised,"' 93  and that the plurality
"undermines Brown's promise of integrated primary and secondary
education."' 94 He stresses that Brown "set the Nation on a path toward
public school integration."'
' 95
Of course, one reading of Brown is simply that the state may not
segregate children on the basis of race. 196 Yet it is fair to infer from
Brown, and especially from later cases requiring segregated systems to
take affirmative steps to bring about integration,' 97 that integration of the
public schools is itself a constitutional value.' 98 That said, it is a separate
191. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). Justice Breyer recognizes this. See 127 S. Ct. at 2815
(Breyer, J., dissenting). He infers, quite reasonably, that integration is an equal
protection value. Thus, he draws from Strauder the proposition that "the basic objective
of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause [was] forbidding practices that lead to
racial exclusion." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). My point is that racial exclusion and
"practices that lead to racial exclusion" are not the same thing. Even if both violate the
Equal Protection Clause, "eradicating state-sponsored racial exclusion" belongs the core
of what that Clause forbids, and "forbidding practices that lead to racial exclusion" is less
central.
192. See 127 S. Ct. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2801 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
196. For a brief but incisive discussion of the broad and narrow readings of Brown,
see Adam Liptak, The Same Words, But Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at
A30.
197. See, e.g., Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430,
441-42 (1968). See also Ryan, supra note 2, at 152 ("The assumption of those who
argued for and supported Brown was that prohibiting segregation would bring about
integration.").
198. Note, however, that this view is not universally held. Notably, Justice Thomas
seems so dispute it. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2787 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("In place of the color-blind Constitution, the dissent would permit measures to keep the
races together and proscribe measures to keep the races apart. Although no such
distinction is apparent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the dissent would constitutionalize
today's faddish social theories that embrace that distinction.").
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question whether the constitutional value of integration should be
accorded as much weight as the "anti-subordination" value that animates
cases like Terry and Burton. Justice Breyer finds no support for the
"integration" value in pre-Brown cases. 199 To the extent the intent of the
Framers is relevant in ranking constitutional values, integration does not
seem to have been a principal concern of supporters of the
Amendment. 200  The point here is not to deny that integration of the
schools is a constitutional value, but to question its rank among equal
protection values.20 1 Absent current purposive segregation, integration
may be a secondary equal protection value, and one that is more easily
outweighed by interests on the other side of the "state action" inquiry.20 2
On this premise, the Court should be more hesitant to extend equal
protection doctrine in this context than it was in Terry or Burton.
Upon reflection, champions of strong equal protection rights for
minorities may find that treating integration as a pre-eminent
constitutional value has some disadvantages. In particular, putting too
much emphasis on integration may get in the way of creative efforts to
remedy the effects of past discrimination. Justice Breyer cites
sociological studies showing the benefits of integration,0 3  but
199. Before Brown, the leading case on the constitutional validity of segregated
public facilities was Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racially
segregated railroad cars against an equal protection challenge on the ground that
"separate but equal" public facilities are constitutionally unobjectionable).
200. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1955).
201. See Juan Williams, Don't Mourn Brown v. Board of Education, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2007 at A29 ("Desegregation does not speak to dropout rates that hover near 50
percent for black and Hispanic high school students. It does not equip society to address
the so-called achievement gap between black and white students that mocks Brown's
promise of equal educational opportunity."). In Tamar Lewin and David M.
Herszenhom's article, Money, Not Race, Is Fueling New Push to Bolster Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2007 at A10, the authors report on similar attitudes among blacks
seeking better schools. They quote Ted Shaw, president of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, who stated:
A lot of black folks say, "Give us the resources, give us the money, we're tired
of chasing white folks, and we don't need integrated schools to have good
education.... It's hard to tell how much of that is weariness and cynicism
with respect to efforts to get racially integrated schools, and I can understand
that."
Id. Mr. Shaw then made clear his own continued commitment to integration. Id.
202. In the wake of Parents Involved, one moderately conservative commentator
questioned the practical viability of the integration goal. See David Brooks, The End of
Integration, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007 at A15. For a radically different view, see Ryan,
supra note 2. Professor Ryan, an avowed champion of integration, see id. at 133,
acknowledges that "the Court over the past half century has sent mixed signals about
school integration," id. at 139, and does not hide his disappointment with the Court's
rejection of the voluntary efforts by Louisville and Seattle, see id. at 154-56.
203. See 127 S. Ct. at 2820-21(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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acknowledges that some studies reach contrary conclusions.2 04  For
instance, one recent program to help black boys succeed in school is
based on the premise that racial and sexual segregation has benefits in
certain contexts.2 °5 Programs of this sort could be thwarted if integration
is treated as a trump that overrides other equal protection values.
D. The Costs of an Expansive State-Action Rule
All the factors considered in Sections A through C concern the
nature of the right at stake and its impact on the state action
determination. Other values, however, also must figure into the
constitutional calculus. "Even facts that suffice to show public action...
may be outweighed in the name of some value at odds with finding
public accountability in the circumstances., 20 6 In particular, the state
action doctrine "preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the
reach of federal law,, 20 7 as shown by cases like Evans and Moose
Lodge.2 0 8 Resolving the state-action issue in future cases that test the
validity of race-conscious integration plans requires more than an
evaluation of the "furthering racial integration" value put forward by
Justice Breyer in favor of upholding the Seattle and Louisville schemes.
That value must be balanced against the constitutional values asserted by
those who challenge the school districts' efforts.
Personal autonomy to live as one pleases, however unattractive the
community at large may find the choices, is the main value that stands in
the way of expansive state-action rulings. 20 9  The respect accorded
personal autonomy by classical liberalism, manifested in many no-state-
action cases, is the root of most communitarian critiques of liberalism.
204. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
205. See Winnie Hu, To Close Gaps, Schools Focus on Black Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 2007, at Al. See also Jerome E. Morris, U.S. Allows Racial Gap in Education?,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, July 24, 2007, at A11. Morris argues that,
[D]esegregation plans will not significantly influence the educational
achievement of black children because all school types (whether predominantly
white, black, or racially mixed) are failing to academically prepare the majority
of black children .... Clearly, it is the continued educational neglect of black
children-more than 50 years after Brown v. Board of Education-which
should be brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, not the constitutionality of
desegregation plans.
Id.
206. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 303
(2001).
207. Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). See also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
208. See supra notes 151, 155 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Evans, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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Despite communitarian objections, Evans and Moose Lodge illustrate
that autonomy carries weight even though it is not one of the Bill of
210Rights and may be exercised for a racist purpose.
The claim asserted by the plaintiffs in Parents Involved may deserve
even more deference than the kind of personal autonomy that carried the
day in Evans and Moose Lodge, because the effect of adopting the
dissent's theory of state action would be to authorize school districts to
classify students on the basis of race.21 While the premise for the
classification would be the Equal Protection value of promoting
integration, the private interest that must be sacrificed-the interest in
not "being forced to live under a state-mandated racial label" 212-is also
a powerful Equal Protection value. 21 3 The presence of a strong private
interest counts against finding a state action on which the "remedy for
prior state-sponsored segregation" theory depends.21 4  But private
210. See supra notes 151, 155 and accompanying text.
211. Justice Breyer acknowledges this cost, though he does not specifically identify it.
He mentions it in a single sentence of a lengthy opinion, then dismisses it in the next
sentence, making no effort to take it seriously. He states "[t]his is not to deny that there
is a cost in applying a state-mandated racial label. But that cost does not approach in
degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and 80 years of
legal racial segregation." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127
S. Ct. 2738, 2836 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
212. 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
213. As Judge Wilkinson puts it, "[t]he whole sad saga of the early African American
experience teaches that racial decisions by the state remain unique in their capacity to
demean. To squeeze human beings of varying talents, interests and backgrounds into an
undifferentiated category of race is to submerge what should matter most about us under
what should matter least." Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 163-64.
214. "Being forced to live under a state-mandated racial label" can have practical
consequences. One critic of race-conscious plans claims that "[t]he children of two of the
white [Seattle] plaintiffs were not assigned to the schools of their choice and ended up
commuting-four hours a day. The parents voted with their feet-opting for private
schools." Abigail Thernstrom, Supreme Gibberish, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2007, at AI5.
Sensitive to this concern, Justice Kennedy distinguished plans that focus on
classifying students by race, which he finds dubious, and those that employ other means
to achieve more integration, such as "strategic site selection for new schools; drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods, [and]
allocating resources for special programs." 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
For example, even before the ruling in Parents Involved Seattle had taken "steps to
encourage racial diversity through other means, including placing highly sought after
International Baccalaureate and dual-language programs in locations where they are
likely to draw a diverse student body." Lewin, supra note 19. If such a program were
challenged, the "remedy for prior state-sponsored segregation" defense would be stronger
than it is in Parents Involved, because the private interest on the other side of the state-
action balance would be weaker than it is when students are classified on the basis of
race. For an illustration of how Justice Kennedy may justify this distinction, see Gerken,
supra note 2, at 119 ("When the state moves from wholesale to retail, from the domain to
the individual, Kennedy's libertarian instincts reemerge. Perhaps that is because
Kennedy thinks that the state is no longer constructing a space in which students choose
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interests in resisting a racial label need to be kept in perspective. My
purpose in highlighting it is not to undercut the case for finding the "state
action" needed to justify government programs employing race-
conscious remedies; rather, it is to identify an important countervailing
consideration that counsels caution in devising and implementing such
policies.
Conclusion
The plurality and dissenting opinions in Parents Involved place
eight of the Justices at opposite poles, with four favoring easy approval
of race-conscious remedies and the other four placing seemingly
insuperable obstacles in their path. Here, as on many current issues,
Justice Kennedy holds the decisive vote, and his opinion in Parents
Involved raises more questions than answers as to where he stands. He,
and other Justices as well, would do well to question the wisdom of
adhering to one pole or the other. This Article argues that a black letter
rule, whether it is the one favored by the plurality or the dissent, fails to
account for the range of factors that ought to be considered in analyzing
the validity of race-conscious remedies.
The root of the problem is to determine how best to deal with
segregation for which government bears some responsibility, on account
of its actions in the past, when it is not currently operating a deliberately
segregated school system. This is, in turn, a "state action" problem, and
their own identities. Instead, it is choosing an identityfor them."). The same is true of
programs that do classify students, but do so on non-racial grounds, such as socio-
economic status or single-parent households, even if these serve as proxies for race. See
Jeffrey Rosen, Can a Law Change Society?, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 4, at 1, 5.
Professor Rosen reports that scholars on both sides of the affirmative action issue "agree
that public schools will use proxies for race ... to achieve their goals." See Robert
Tomsho, More Schools Likely to Spur Diversity via Income, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2007,
at B1. By distinguishing between "state intervention that classifies [a student] on the
basis of his race," 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and these less direct
means for promoting integration, the Court could achieve an accommodation between
liberal and communitarian values, retaining the liberal commitment to personal autonomy
while finding ways to promote the communitarian goal of greater racial and social
integration. For that matter, the communitarian project may stand a greater chance of
success to the extent it can be pursued by means that do not visit government regulation
directly on families seeking (what they regard as) the best schools for their children, with
all the antagonism and litigation hazards that accompany such programs.
Whether the "state action" doctrine is the appropriate constitutional principle for
drawing this distinction is a separate question. It may seem artificial to treat the drawing
of school district lines differently from student assignment on the ground that the latter
involves state action while the former does not. It appears that Justice Kennedy would
simply rule that the former program is more "narrowly tailored" to achieve the
compelling state interest in avoiding racial isolation, because it does not intrude as much
on the equal protection value of not living "under a state-mandated racial label." 127 S.
Ct. at 2796-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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its resolution should reflect the flexibility and highly contextual analysis
that is characteristic of cases applying state action doctrine. Instead of an
all-or-nothing rule, a context-specific approach better reflects the array of
factors that bear on the wisdom and fairness of a particular race-
conscious remedy for segregated public schools in a particular school
district. In this way, the Court can give due regard to both the worthy
communitarian goal of integrating the public schools and the equally
worthy individual right against discrimination on the basis of race.
